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DOES MONOPOLY BROTH MAKE BAD SOUP?
DANIEL A. CRANE*
There is an oft-repeated maxim in U.S. antitrust law that a monopo-
list's conduct must be examined in its totality in order to determine its
legality.' Judges admonish that plaintiffs "should be given the full bene-
fit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizating the various fac-
tual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each."2 As
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in much-quoted
language, "It is the mix of various ingredients ... in a monopoly broth
that produces the unsavory flavor."'
In this article, I examine the use and misuse of monopoly broth theo-
ries. Reflecting a certain ambivalence on the topic, I deliberately have
chosen an ambiguous title. Does monopoly broth make bad soup be-
cause a monopolist's disparate bad acts sometimes combine to threaten
competition in a way that would not be apparent if one simply examined
each act in isolation? Or are monopoly broth theories the problem?
I argue that both of these senses of my title are valid. On the one
hand, in a certain class of cases-particularly those where the legality of
a defendant's contracts depends on whether they foreclose a substantial
share of the relevant market-it is necessary to consider the aggregate
effect of defendant's conduct in order to determine legality. In those
cases, determining legality on a contract-by-contract or practice-by-prac-
tice basis would systematically lead to false negatives. On the other hand,
the "monopoly broth" maxim is susceptible to misuse, particularly if ap-
* Member of the Florida and New York bars and Professor of Law, University of Michi-
gan. Many thanks for helpful comments to Adi Ayal, who served as commentator, and the
other participants at the Issues at the Forefront of Monopolization and Abuse of Domi-
nance Conference held at the University of Haifa (May 2009).
1 On the general question of aggregating various antitrust claims in order to establish
liability, see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 310, at 197-210 (3d ed. 2007).
2 Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
3 City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1980).
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plied to species of conduct whose legality depends on a developed con-
duct-specific test. In such cases, the prima facie legality of the conduct
should be determined on a practice-by-practice basis. Any conduct that
does not meet the relevant conduct-specific test should not be allowed
to count toward liability or any other issue. In particular, plaintiffs
should not be allowed to invoke "monopoly broth" rhetoric in order to
defeat established legal tests applicable to different kinds of conduct.
I. WHAT'S AT STAKE: RULES AND STANDARDS
Before we come to the specific principles that do, or should, govern
monopoly broth theories, we should step back and consider the issue in
its broader juridical context. At its core, the question presented is
whether rules or standards are more appropiate for antitrust cases in
general and monopolization cases in particular. In the traditional juridi-
cal distinction, a rule is a legal norm that makes liability turn on a small
number of concrete factors, whereas a standard makes liability turn on a
much more open-ended set of considerations. 4 So a sixty-mile-per-hour
speed limit is a rule, and a "drive reasonably given road and traffic con-
ditions" norm is a standard. Similarly, requiring a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant priced below average variable cost sounds like a rule,
whereas requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant priced unrea-
sonably in order to foreclose competition sounds like a standard.
Elsewhere, I have argued that rules are often more appropriate than
standards in antitrust cases. 5 Particularly in the exclusionary conduct
arena, open-ended standards fail to give adequate notice to business
people and, therefore, prevent effective business planning. Further, in
the U.S. civil litigation system, standards tend to delegate decision-mak-
ing authority to lay juries (instead of judges) that are not well-equipped
to deal with the complexities of monopolization litigation. 6 Rules are
often more administrable than open-ended standards and less likely to
chill efficiency-enhancing behavior. And rules may streamline litigation
and reduce its costs.
Perhaps the greatest danger of monopoly broth theories is that they
allow plaintiffs to transfer theories of exclusionary conduct from the do-
main of rules to the domain of standards. Under a liberal use of monop-
oly broth theories, plaintiffs can avoid the rules put in place to govern
4 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 49 (2007).
5 See id. For a more pro-standard perspective, see Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R.
Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IowA L. REv. 1207 (2008).
6 Crane, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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various different exclusionary practices theories simply by alleging that
they are pleading a different kind of theory-one that asks for a pattern
of conduct to be analyzed as a whole and not in its discrete parts. As only
the most general standards are capable of ascertaining whether a pat-
tern of conduct, taken as a whole, is exclusionary, monopoly broth theo-
ries can transform poor antitrust cases into jury trials with a wave of the
hand. Only an incompetent plaintiff's lawyer cannot find another spe-
cies of bad conduct to tack onto a predatory pricing case if he cannot
prove pricing below cost, or to a predatory product design case if he
cannot prove that the new design was inferior to the old one. Further,
monopoly broth theories may be particularly persuasive to fact-finders
who cannot make out the technical details of any of the discrete forms
of misconduct alleged but can understand a story about the cumulative
effects of the conduct on the defendant's rival. 7 If we are to have rules
governing at least some classes of exclusionary conduct, then it is neces-
sary that the plaintiff prove a violation of the relevant rules-conduct by
conduct-before invoking a monopoly broth theory of liability.
On the other hand, it would be impossible to administer antitrust ad-
judication solely on the basis of hard-and-fast rules. The "rules versus
standards" literature frequently observes that rules have a tendency to
erode into standards when the relevant subject matter is complex and
the terms of the rule ambiguous.8 A good example of this is the "rule" of
per se illegality for price fixing, which has been applied to conduct that
literally is not price fixing and not applied to conduct that literally is
price fixing.9 Often, before applying the "rule" it is necessary to under-
take an initial inquiry into the economic effects of the conduct-
whether it tends to be output increasing or reducing.'0 This "characteri-
zation" step merely shifts a standard-based analysis to the front end of
the liability determination. The conduct is condemned as per se illegal
under a rule-based form of rhetoric, but only after a standard-based
triaging analysis has determined that the conduct is "price fixing."
The upshot is that neither rules nor standards can do all of the work
in antitrust law. Courts need to arrive at sensible principles that allow
the application of rules when rules would tend most often to get the
decision right, save litigation costs, and increase predictability-and
7FTC CommissionerJ. Thomas Rosch has argued that monopoly broth theories "have
to be considered extremely valuable in trying to persuade any trier of fact-especially a
lay jury-that monopolization (or an attempt to monopolize) has occurred." J. Thomas
Rosch, Evolution of Exclusive Dealing Law, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 51, 56 (2006).
8 Crane, supra note 4, at 72-76.
9 Id.
10 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
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when the rules could actually be applied without inevitably eroding into
standards. Where these objectives cannot be satisfied, it is better not to
announce rules, which simply obscure the standard-based analysis that is
going on under the surface of the purported rule.
With these background observations, I propose three principles-
partly descriptive and partly normative-to govern monopoly broth
theories.
II. INDEPENDENTLY LAWFUL CONDUCT MAY NOT BE
COMBINED WITH OTHER CONDUCT TO
CREATE ILLEGALITY
Courts are fond of saying something to the following effect: "[I] t
would not be proper to focus on specific individual acts of an accused
monopolist while refusing to consider their overall combined effect . . . We
are dealing with what has been called the 'synergistic effect' of the mix-
ture of the elements."" However, there exists-or should exist-a class
of competitive acts that are per se lawful and cannot become unlawful
by combining them with other acts. Examples include above-cost price
discounting, technological innovations creating product improvements,
unconditional and unilateral refusals to deal with rivals, and non-preda-
tory package pricing. Such conduct should never be allowed into a mo-
nopoly broth theory, because it is not unlawful-regardless of its effect
on competitors or competition.
There is support in U.S. law, albeit with some contradiction, for the
proposition that such per se legal conduct cannot be thrown into the
cauldron in order to create liability. For example, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has "reject[ed] the notion that if there is a
fraction of validity to each of the basic claims and the sum of the frac-
tion is one or more, the plaintiffs have proved a violation." 2 Although it
is easy to get lost in this arithmetic metaphor, the basic point appears to
be that if elements of a theory of liability are missing, the entire theory
of liability falls out and cannot be revived by an incremental approach of
mixing and matching it with other similarly deficient theories of
liability.
An excellent and concrete example of this principle in application is
the Second Circuit's decision in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T, 3 an
old-fashioned decision concerning access to telecommunications infra-
" City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added).
12 City of Groton v. Conn. Power & Light Co., 662 F.2d 921, 928 (2d Cir. 1981).
13 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
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structure, rendered on the cusp of the AT&T break-up and long before
the days of the 1996 Telecom Act, 14 and the decisions it spawned, such
as Verizon 5 and linkLine.16 In 1968, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ruled that the Bell telephone companies were obliged to inter-
connect with competitors wishing to sell telephone terminal equipment
(which was used primarily by businesses).17 AT&T's Connecticut affili-
ate-SNET-allegedly engaged in a variety of anticompetitive acts de-
signed to impede Northeastern Telephone's ability to compete in the
terminal equipment market.
At trial, Northeastern Telephone tried to prove six different species of
monopolistic misconduct: It alleged that SNET engaged in predatory
pricing, filed anticompetitive tariff applications, instituted an exclusion-
ary "two-tier payment plan," employed anticompetitive marketing and
advertising methods, leveraged its monopoly power in the telephone
business to obtain power in the terminal market, and introduced a de-
fective coupler device (to be used for interconnection from SNET's
phone line to Northeastern's terminal equipment) that limited North-
eastern's access to the market.' 8 Ajury returned a verdict for Northeast-
ern, finding that each of the six challenged actions was anti-
competitive. 9
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that five of the six challenged
activities were not anticompetitive. For example, on the predatory pric-
ing claim, the court adopted the Areeda-Turner average variable cost
test 0 and found that SNET had not priced below cost.2' It similarly
found that none of the other theories-apart from the allegedly preda-
tory introduction of the coupler-met the relevant legal test for that
particular species of conduct. 2 The court found, however, that there
was sufficient evidence of predatory product design as to the coupler
and remanded for a new trial on that issue only.
2 3
14Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
15 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
16 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
17 Northeastern Telephone, 651 F.2d at 79-80.
18 Id. at 80-81.
19 Id. at 82.
20 Id. at 86, 88 (citing Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975)).
21 Northeastern Telephone, 651 F.2d at 87-91.
22 Id. at 96.
23 Id. at 95-96.
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Northeastern strenuously argued that its monopolization claim
should not be segmented into discrete pieces-that it "should be given
the full benefit of [its] proof without tightly compartmentalizing the va-
rious factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of
each."2 4 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, finding that "treat-
ing Northeastern's claims collectively [could not] have any synergistic
effect."2 5 Northeastern could press forward with its predatory product
design claim, but without resort to evidence of the lawful conduct.
26
Northeastern Telephone establishes an important principle. Where there
are developed tests for a particular species of competitive conduct such
as predatory pricing, a plaintiff must first satisfy the test as to each spe-
cies of allegedly anticompetitive conduct before measuring the cumula-
tive or "synergistic" effect of the conduct. Shortcuts that skip the
elements of different theories of exclusionary behavior and go straight
to a "cumulative effects" bottom line are prohibited. Further, prelimi-
nary success on one legal theory-the predatory product design in
Northeastern Telephone--does not allow the plaintiff to continue to invoke
other lawful conduct in order to create liability.
Notwithstanding Northeastern Telephone and some similar decisions,
courts continue to fumble over monopoly broth theories. Consider, for
example, the following statement from a recent district court decision
(citing an earlier Ninth Circuit decision):
Recognizing the danger of falsely condemning innovation and compe-
tition, it should be "much more difficult to find overall wrongdoing"
when considering only "a number of perfectly legal acts." Even "a find-
ing of some slight wrongdoing in certain areas need not by itself add
up to a violation" of section 2. What matters is whether the "synergistic
effect" of the alleged conduct is to harm competition, and thus perpet-
uate a monopoly.
2 7
Much more difficult? Why should a "perfectly legal act" combined
with another "perfectly legal act" ever add up to illegality? Is it possible
that SNET's above-cost pricing could suddenly become suspect when
combined with its aggressive but otherwise permissible advertising? Can
two rights make a wrong?
24 Id. at 95 n.28 (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 699 (1962)).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 96.
27 Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., 2008 WL 4911230, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2008)
(quoting City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992))
(internal citations omitted).
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Even the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise suffers from some imprecision
on this point. It states:
In a monopolization case conduct must always be analyzed "as a
whole." A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant position is likely
to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each one
viewed in isolation might be viewed as de minimis or an error injudg-
ment, but the pattern gives increasing plausibility to the claim.
28
The assertion that the monopolist's conduct must "always" be viewed as
a whole is problematic. If the conduct viewed individually is lawful, it is
hard to see what can be added by viewing it as a whole.29 Hence, there
will be many occasions in which the monopolist's conduct analyzed in
isolation will not yield illegality, and there is no occasion for viewing the
conduct as a whole.
The confusion appears to arise from the supposition that a group of
otherwise legal acts could become illegal based on their cumulative ef-
fect on a competitor. In this way of thinking, the individual acts are "per-
fectly legal" only because they are not capable of harming competition,
whereas the sum of the acts might harm competition. But rules, such as
those protecting above-cost price cutting, product-design changes result-
ing in product improvement, above-cost bundled discounts after dis-
count reallocation, and refusals to deal with rivals, are not premised on
the view that these acts are incapable of harming competition. Above-
cost price cuts, building better mousetraps, bundled discounting by di-
versified firms, and refusals to aid new entrants can indeed harm com-
petition. But those acts are immunized from liability for a variety of
reasons including a fear of false positives, the need to give adequate
notice to business people for planning and fairness purpose, the admin-
istrative difficulty of policing certain kinds of competitive conduct, ideo-
logical commitment to a light regulatory hand in policing competitive
behavior, and the view that any short-term harm to competition will be
more than offset by the long-term efficiency and productive gains that
result from allowing free play (within the boundaries of the rule) on
matters, such as innovation, marketing, and pricing. To reduce all mo-
nopolization law to a case-by-case inquiry on whether the sum of the
defendant's conduct harms competition is to miss a much more com-
plex set of policy and juridical inputs into monopolization law and to
create excessive uncertainty in adjudication.
2 8 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 310c7, at 208.
2 Elsewhere the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise appears to acknowledge as much, stating
that aggregation should not be permitted when "plaintiff fails to prove an element essen-
tial to every claim." Id. 1 310c2, at 202.
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To be sure, there is a stage of analysis in every monopolization case in
which the effects of the defendant's conduct-individually or in total-
on competition must be addressed. In all attempt cases, liability can only
attach if the defendant's conduct creates a dangerous probability of mo-
nopolization. In a predatory pricing case, the below-cost price is not un-
lawful unless it creates monopoly power by excluding rivals. But these
kinds of effects inquiries only arise once the conduct has been shown to
be prima facie unlawful. We do not come to the dangerous probability
inquiry unless the conduct is exclusionary or to the exclusion step in
predation cases unless the price is below cost.
III. CONDUCT WHOSE LEGALITY DEPENDS ON ITS
CUMULATIVE FORECLOSURE EFFECT MAY BE
ASSESSED "SYNERGISTICALLY"
I have just argued that monopoly broth theories should not be em-
ployed as to kinds of conduct governed by rule-like tests that prohibit
liability unless the defendant has crossed some concrete hurdle-such
as below-cost pricing in a predatory pricing case. In other cases, how-
ever, aggregating a monopolist's disparate acts in order to determine
liability makes perfect sense. This approach may be particularly appro-
priate when the legality of the defendant's conduct turns on whether it
forecloses a significant share of the relevant market-an issue that is the
key determinant in exclusive dealing cases30 and plays a role in other
kinds of cases as well, such as tying and bundled discounting cases. In
such cases, it is necessary to look at the total effect of the defendant's
"foreclosing" contracts in order to determine whether the market as a
whole is substantially foreclosed.
A case that sensibly establishes this proposition is the Supreme
Court's Continental Ore decision-which includes the "full benefit of
their proof without tightly compartmentalizating" 31 language that has
given rise to some mischief when applied in other contexts. In that case,
defendants allegedly foreclosed plaintiff's access to the vanadium ore
market through a series of exclusive dealing arrangements. 32 Acting on
its own or through its subsidiaries or affiliates, Union Carbide allegedly
acquired control of various mines (and then denied plaintiff access),
entered into an exclusive purchasing agent relationship with the Cana-
dian government, threatened other firms that were considering doing
business with the plaintiff, and interfered with a joint venture agree-
3 0Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
31 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
s1 Id at 691-95.
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ment between the plaintiff and another company. 3s The net effect of
this conduct was that the plaintiff was stymied at every turn.
The court of appeals excused away each of these separate acts, finding
that none of the acts individually foreclosed the plaintiff from the vana-
dium market.3 4 True enough, but the various contracts and arrange-
ments in combination resulted in a substantially foreclosed market. To
give an extreme example, suppose that the market consisted of 100 cus-
tomers and that a monopolist entered into an exclusive dealing contract
with each one. The sum of the foreclosure would be 100 percent of the
market, even though the effect of each individual contract was de
minimis. Clearly, an exclusive dealing analysis would need to consider
the effect of the monopolist's contracts as a whole in order to determine
legality. The Supreme Court was therefore justified in finding that Con-
tinental Ore
should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compart-
mentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate clean
after scrutiny of each .... "(T)he character and effect of a conspiracy
are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts,
but only by looking at it as a whole."
3 5
It is easy to apply the aggregation principle in exclusive dealing cases
because, there, foreclosure is the entire story. But there are other cate-
gories of cases where foreclosure is only a part of the story-usually, the
part that comes after other elements have been established. For exam-
ple, in tying cases foreclosure may matter, but only after various other
elements-such as the presence of two separate products, market power
in the tying market, and the presence of "forcing"36 -have been estab-
lished. Loyalty discounts may function to induce exclusive dealing and
hence require a foreclosure analysis, but typically only after a showing
that they would force a rival to price below cost.
3 v
In mixed cases involving exclusive dealing and other forms of conduct
that may have foreclosing effects, the aggregation should occur only af-
ter each form of conduct has been adjudged prima facie exclusionary.
For example, suppose that a defendant entered into exclusive dealing
contracts involving 15 percent of the relevant market, offered loyalty dis-
counts on another 15 percent of the market, and entered into tying con-
33 Id. at 694-95.
3 Id. at 698.
35 Id. at 699 (citation omitted).
36 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984).
37 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060-63 (8th Cir.
2000).
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tracts that covered 30 percent of the market. The proper analysis would
begin with an inquiry into whether the loyalty discounts were predatory
and whether the alleged tying contracts met the elements of an unlawful
tie-in (putting aside, for a moment, the foreclosure question). Suppose
that the loyalty discounts were shown not to be predatory but that the
tying contracts met the legal test for tying. Then, the 15 percent of the
market covered by the exclusive dealing contract and the 30 percent
covered by the tying contracts should be aggregated (assuming that they
did not overlap) and an analysis performed on whether foreclosure of
45 percent of this particular market is substantial.
3 8
A related point: An analysis of aggregate foreclosure should only oc-
cur within a properly defined relevant market. If the defendant has ex-
clusive dealing contracts that cover 20 percent of one market, tying
arrangements that cover 20 percent of another, and loyalty rebates that
cover 20 percent of a third market, no aggregation should be allowed.
There simply is not an antitrust case in those circumstances, as none of
the markets is substantially foreclosed.
IV. INDEPENDENTLY UNLAWFUL CONDUCT MAY ONLY BE
ASSESSED "SYNERGISTICALLY" IF THE PLAINTIFF
ADVANCES A COHERENT THEORY AS TO
HOW THE DISPARATE ACTS
COMBINED TO INJURE COMPETITION
The previous two sections have focused on conduct that is potentially
unlawful because of antitrust law. But sometimes monopolization cases
involve conduct that is separately unlawful, usually because of tort law or
a statutory or regulatory scheme. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly cautioned that "[e]ven an act of pure malice by one business
competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under
the federal antitrust laws[,]"3 9 in many monopolization cases plaintiffs
attempt to make use of a smorgasbord of tortious bad acts or statutory
violations by the defendant to create antitrust liability. Examples of the
kind of offense monopolists may commit to further their monopoly
power include defamation, trade libel, tortious inference with contract
or prospective business relationship, trespass to chattels (think of the
3
8 That question should ordinarily turn on whether the foreclosure denies rivals the
opportunity to reach minimum viable scale. See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine,
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv.
617, 636 (1999) ("In the simplest analysis of exclusives as customer foreclosure, the mo-
nopolist might sign a sufficient number of customers to low-priced, long-term exclusive
contracts so that the rival is driven below minimum viable scale.").
39 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).
[Vol. 76
HeinOnline  -- 76 Antitrust L.J. 672 2009-2010
DOES MONOPOLY BROTH MAKE BAD Soup?
old saw about blowing up the competitor's factory), fraudulent induce-
ment to contract, misrepresentation, Lanham Act (trademark) viola-
tions, patent or copyright infringement, and commercial bribery.
Sometimes these are combined with more conventional antitrust theo-
ries in order to brew up some monopoly broth. The question then is
how independently unlawful acts may be combined to create monopoli-
zation liability.
Here, the basic rule should be that the plaintiff may only combine
disparate, independently unlawful acts into a monopoly broth if the
plaintiff advances a coherent theory about how the disparate acts com-
bined to injure competition. The plaintiff should not be allowed simply
to allege a laundry list of bad acts by the defendant and get to a jury by
claiming that all of the bad acts chipped away at the rival's viability in
the market. The plaintiff should be required to show how the alleged
bad acts worked in concert to reduce the rival's market position.
Suppose, for example, that the defendant-monopolist does three al-
legedly anticompetitive things: (1) it disseminates a false rumor about
an anticipated earnings shortfall by a publicly traded rival, which in turn
causes a collapse in the rival's stock price and, hence, causes a venture
capitalist to back out of a large equity infusion into the rival; (2) it
brings a new product to market in infringement of the rival's patents at
a crucial moment, which slows the rival's product in achieving market
acceptance; and (3) it interferes with a line of credit the rival sought at a
lending institution by bribing a bank executive to deny the loan. Assume
that the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as
to the independent illegality of each of these three acts. How should the
judge consider the "synergistic" effect of these three bad acts?
The answer depends largely on whether the plaintiff is able to tell a
record-supported story about how the disparate bad acts combined to
drive it out of the market. The first and third stories both involve the
rival's access to capital and, hence, seem to go hand-in-hand. If the de-
fendant simultaneously blocks the rival's access to the debt and equity
markets, the effect may be to starve the rival of resources needed to
compete. On the other hand, there is no obvious link between the first
and third bad acts and the second. In order to claim a "synergistic ef-
fect" from all three bad acts, the plaintiff would need to explain how the
deprivation of capital combined with the patent infringement to drive
the rival from the market. Was there something about the loss of capital
that made the infringement worse than a run-of-the-mill patent infringe-
ment case? Was the slowness in the market acceptance of the rival's
product because of the patent infringement a contributing factor in the
20101
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venture capitalist's decision to pull out? Simply declaring that the acts
amounted to "death by a thousand cuts" should not suffice.
Sometimes, the alleged misconduct involves a combination of torts
and conduct that is only unlawful because of antitrust law. For example,
in Conwood v. United States Tobacco Co.,40 the defendant allegedly em-
ployed a combination of torts (such as trade libel and destroying plain-
tiff's store racks) and exclusive dealing-type arrangements. 41 In such
cases, it may well be that both the tortious acts and the exclusive dealing
contracts had a foreclosing effect. For instance, if the exclusive dealing
contracts covered 30 percent of the market and the defendant's tortious
acts deprived Conwood of the opportunity to be in stores amounting to
an additional 20 percent of the market, then it may be sensible to say
that the alleged acts cumulatively foreclosed 50 percent of the market-
which will often be sufficient to state a monopolization claim.
On the other hand, independently unlawful acts should not be al-
lowed to create antitrust liability out of acts that are otherwise per se
lawful. For example, if the defendant blew up one of its competitors'
factories and also priced slightly above marginal cost, only the blowing
up of the factory should count toward liability. One might consider an
exception if the plaintiff were able to tell a convincing story about how
the destruction of one of its factories caused it to lose efficiencies in
other factories, such that it was unable to match defendant's aggressive
(but above marginal cost) price cuts. But then the lynchpin of liability
would not be above-cost pricing, but rather a plainly illegal act that
raised a rival's costs with strongly anticompetitive effects. 42 If the plaintiff
were unable to prove that the defendant blew up the factory, the pricing
behavior would have to be adjudicated per se lawful. This example is not
really about changing the rules for a predatory pricing case because of a
monopoly broth theory, but about allowing the plaintiff to prove an an-
ticompetitive chain of events precipitated by an undoubtedly tortious
and criminal act.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a place for monopoly broth theories in the world of antitrust
adjudication. It is impossible to govern all monopolization cases under
hard-and-fast rules, and there are undoubtedly some cases in which le-
gality should turn on an analysis of the effects of the conduct, taken as a
40 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
41 Id. at 775-78.
42 See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YAuE L.J. 209 (1986).
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whole. But such theories should not be permitted to destroy the domain
of monopolization rules-particularly rules that immunize certain spe-
cies of aggressive but generally beneficial competitive behavior. Courts
should take care to ensure that the "synergistic effect" of the alleged
pattern of conduct does not allow the whole to become greater than the
sum of the parts.
The monopoly broth theory raises a broader issue-whether rules or
standards are superior in antitrust adjudication. Of course, it would be
wrong to suppose that either rules or standards are optimal all of the
time. As Judge Richard Posner has noted in another context, "[n]o sen-
sible person supposes that rules are always superior to standards, or vice
versa." 43 Courts and litigants must carefully consider the comparative ad-
vantages and disadavantages of antitrust rules or standards in various
contexts. Monopoly broth theories thus will continue to raise a broad
and interesting set of questions as antitrust law continues its inevitable
search for the optimal level of liability determinant specification.
43 MindGames, Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
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